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Machine Learning Systems in Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications 
Architecture: 
Opportunities, Limitations, and Recommendations for Strategic Commanders 
“With the increase in the complexity of warfare, the science of war is increasingly dependent 
upon human guidance. No matter how complicated it may become, war is always waged by 
men.” 
― FM22-10, Department of the Army Field Manual, Leadership (1951) 
Introduction 
 Time-restricted, uncertain, and data-dependent. These characteristics of nuclear 
command and control underscore the challenges strategists and nuclear force commanders 
face. As a result, nuclear powers – including the United States, China, and Russia – are 
beginning to discuss opportunities to apply artificial intelligence (AI)1 to nuclear command 
and control (NC2) operations.2 The start of the dialogue reflects recent advances in neural 
networks, algorithmic design, and computing power that have enabled high-reliability AI 
systems to be developed and employed in national security settings as sensitive as nuclear 
control. 
 Although these systems offer opportunities to increase the speed of analysis and 
improve accuracy, the state of technology today is limited, and end-users are still grappling 
with its application. As commanders and decision-makers begin to integrate AI-driven 
                                                          
1 In the Introduction the term “artificial intelligence” is used in its colloquial sense. In the technical section, this paper will 
differentiate between “true” artificial intelligence and machine learning systems – the latter which forms the majority of the 
agents described and referenced in this paper. 
2 This paper will focus on AI’s nuclear potential in the United States, China, and Russia. For U.S.-based research: Geist, 
Edward, and Andrew J. Lohn. “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?” RAND Corporation, 24 Apr. 
2018, rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html.; For a Russian perspective: Stefanovich, Dmitry. “Artificial Intelligence and 
Nuclear Weapons.” RIAC, 6 May 2019, russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/artificial-intelligence-and-
nuclear-weapons/.; A U.S. analyst’s perspective on Chinese nuclear posture: Saalman, Lora. “Fear of False Negatives: AI and 




systems into their watch floors and command centers, they must be aware of how these 
systems operate as part of their overall team. The promise of these systems and today’s geo-
political environment suggests that states and militaries will move quickly to implement 
these technologies. This implementation needs to be done intelligently for not only our 
security, but the safety of the world. 
AI systems today and in the near future offer the potential to ease the time, 
uncertainty, and information deluge burdens that characterize NC2. At the same time, this 
emerging enabling technology is both limited and carries risk in its current technological 
state. The consequences of misapplication or error could be existential. As commanders look 
for ways to integrate these systems into their teams, they must do so deliberately and 
purposefully. This paper will assess the opportunities and challenges to apply ML 
techniques in NC2 systems. The results of this analysis show that although adoption 
challenges may exist, the potential to reduce errors and increase decision-making time are 
significant. As such, the paper will outline how the technology can be best adopted. It will 
offer recommendations that spans from development to employment in an effort to manage 
the risk associated with integrating the new technology. Ultimately, this paper does not 
aim to deter leaders, but instead highlight possible integration challenges so that this 
incredibly capable technology does not become stigmatized due to misapplications. 
 This paper will focus on AI and machine learning (ML) systems based on the current 
state of technology. Bounding the discussion to the technology available today and in the 
near-term, helps provide proper grounding. Otherwise, there is risk that the conversation 
can drift and lose relevance to the present-day challenges.3 This paper first focuses on the 
                                                          
3 This paper will use the following words or phrases rather interchangeably: “ML system”, “learning system”, “computer 
learning agent”, and “agent”. When projecting future application of AI and ML based on today’s technology, this paper 
assumes the absence of a major breakthrough in the research. An example of a “major breakthrough” would be a development 
on par with the discovery of neural nets and the onset of deep learning systems. 
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subject’s technical dimension. It will describe artificial intelligence broadly, establish a 
working definition for our purposes, and then focus on an agent’s learning element and its 
capacity to “evolve” from performance-based learning. The second section outlines the 
United States’ nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) architecture from 
open-source literature. The next section will analyze the potential vulnerabilities to these 
computer agents and learning systems. In this section, I will highlight three primary 
sources of vulnerability: data, algorithms, and the individual user. The final section offers 
recommendations to mitigate the potential effects of the aforementioned vulnerabilities, 
emphasizing efforts to bridge the Silicon Valley-Pentagon divide, an agile development 
process, and personnel diversity.  
How Do Computer Agents Learn? 
 According to Stuart Russel and Peter Norvig, an agent – whether human, a rules-
based system, or an AI system – is anything that takes in information from its environment 
through sensors and then acts upon that environment through actuators.4 A computer 
agent – to include AI – consists of an agent program and architecture.5 The architecture 
functions to push the perceived environmental inputs to the program, runs the program, 
and provides the chosen actions to the actuators. For example, a “simple reflex” agent only 
utilizes the current environmental input, makes a decision based on a “condition-action 
rule”, and acts back upon its environment through its actuators (Figure 1). 
                                                          
4 Russell, Stuart J., and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall, 2009., pg. 34 
5 An agent program is designed to complete the agent’s function, which runs from initial environmental percepts to actions. 




Figure 1, “Simple Reflex Agent”6 
This agent type is inherently limited to its designers’ imaginations and would be 
unable to operate in conditions not already anticipated. Even if all conditions could be 
anticipated, it would be burdensome to program all of these scenarios. Operations in 
complex environments such as warfare would be nearly impossible. As early as 1950, Alan 
Turing suggested that machines should be built to learn and then trained. Such a 
“learning” agent would offer significantly more potential. Today, these “learning” agents 
have come to supplant simple reflex – or rules-based – agents as the dominant agent type 
observed today. 
Learning Agents 
A learning agent is capable of learning from its own experiences. These experiences 
can be through interaction with its environment or training induced. This agent type is 
comprised of four general components: a learning element, performance element, critic, and 
problem generator (Figure 2). The first component, the learning element, is tasked with 
making improvements to the agent. Second, the performance element selects the external 
action. It is analogous to the entire simple-reflex agent in that this element takes inputs 
                                                          
6 ibid, 49. 
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and delivers outputs through actuators. These first two elements are inextricably linked. 
The learning element can effect changes to the knowledge components after observing pairs 
of successive environmental states caused by the performance element’s action. To facilitate 
this, the critic evaluates how the agent is performing in relation to a defined performance 
standard. The last general element is the problem generator which suggests exploratory 
actions that may undermine short-term performance for long-run effectiveness.7  
 
Figure 2: “Learning Agent”8 
For the purposes of identifying these system’s limitations and integration challenges 
in the NC3 architecture, it will be helpful to walk through these elements using a simple 
example. Take a learning agent developed for use in radiology. Its objective is to identify 
cancer images and produce a quantitative assessment from imaging data. This agent’s task 
is to improve its ability to correctly diagnose patients. Its performance is to be measured 
with respect to the percentage of patients properly diagnosed based on its training with pre-
diagnosed medical histories of patients.9 Mechanically, sensors would observe images with 
                                                          
7 ibid, 55-56. 
8 Russel and Norvig (2009), 55. 
9 Specifically, this example is illustrating a type of supervised learning process. Learning agents can also learn through 
unsupervised and reinforcement learning techniques. 
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pre-labeled features that were extracted and identified by human experts. The learning 
element will quantify these features based on the critic component’s feedback, which is 
determined by the expert’s performance standard. The problem generator will explore other 
characterizations and feed this information to the performance element. In the end, the 
performance element will classify the image quantifiably and provide this output to support 
human analysis in detection.10 Each successive interaction with its environment – a new 
image – will be quantified into an attribute set and evaluated. The more interaction that an 
agent has with its environment, the more reliable it will become. In radiology, this type of 
learning helps decrease the false negative rate – the rate at which cancer goes unidentified 
from an image. 
Machine Learning Today 
Advances in the field have given birth to more efficient and effective learning 
agents. As opposed to “condition-action” rules, agents “learn” from algorithms and datasets. 
This approach is called machine learning and has been successful in enabling computer 
agents to complete specific tasks. Operationally, human-designed algorithms map features 
observed from the machine learning agent’s environment and choose an output. Although 
commonly used interchangeably, machine learning and deep learning refer to two different 
categories within the AI field. In short, deep learning is a training technique within the 
machine learning subfield of artificial intelligence.   
Deep learning is a specific machine learning technique that relies on artificial neural 
networks. Neural networks consist of many layers of artificial neurons which loosely mimic 
biological neurons. The network starts off as a blank slate, and algorithms “learn directly 
                                                          




by navigating the data space, giving them superior problem-solving capabilities.”11 Rather 
than identifying features utilizing a human-designed algorithm, deep learning systems 
extract features from raw data. Successive neural layers enable observations from an input 
image to be filtered increasingly more specifically. As data is extracted and selected 
through “hidden layers”, pooling layers will aggregate the features that have been observed, 
and fully connected layers will enable classification. 12 Training a high-reliability system 
requires an appropriate number of hidden layers and large sets of data.13 
These distinctions – between artificial intelligence, machine learning, and deep 
learning – are helpful when having discussions around these emerging technologies. 
Specifically, when we consider the limitations and challenges of adopting these systems into 
our operations, precision of language helps illuminate the actual issues at-hand. 
An Enabling Technology 
 The last technical point for consideration before a broader discussion is to consider 
how AI and ML14 will be used in NC3. AI and ML, as technologies, are not tools in and of 
themselves. Rather, they are merely an enabling technology similar to the combustion 
engine. The impact AI and ML will have on crisis management operations will be 
determined by their use within systems rather than their existence. Because their utility 
will be derived from their application, successful implementation will be the responsibility 
of all team members and require a new form of “adoption management.” 
                                                          
11 Hosny (2018). 
12 ibid 
13 The amount of data that is required for a machine learning algorithm to learn a target function is referred to as “sample 
complexity” in AI research. 
14 In the previous section I have defined that the state of today’s technology is more accurately described by the term “machine 
learning”. From this point forward, I will refer to systems in our current day as “ML”, “learning systems”, and “learning 
agents”, which will be used to encompass both ML and deep learning systems. References to AI will be to the long-term 
actualization of autonomous, adaptable systems. 
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NC3 Architecture and Opportunities to Leverage Machine Learning Systems 
 The Nuclear Matters Handbook, published by the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, describes the U.S. Nuclear Command and 
Control System (NCCS)15 as “an essential element to ensure crisis stability, deter attack 
against the United States and its allies, and maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness 
of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”16 The system is expansive and includes land-, air-, sea- and 
space-based components.17 These components support the President’s ability “to authorize 
the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.” 18 
Furthermore, NCCS “relies on a collection of activities, processes, and procedures 
performed by appropriate military commanders and support personnel that…allow for 
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”19 Interagency personnel from 
across the Executive Branch – to include Department of Defense, Department of State, 
Department of Justice, among others – are stakeholders in the NCCS. 
 The NC3 architecture is a complex system but can be generally categorized into four 
components. These four components highlight the interconnected nature, scale of available 
data, and consequences of action emanating from the system. The White House, Pentagon, 
and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) sit on top of the structure and the 
intersection of sensors, networks, and kinetic platforms. The primary fixed, integrative 
NC2 facility is the National Military Command Center (NMCC) inside the Pentagon. 
                                                          
15 NCCS refers to the overall system that provides the President the means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. NC3 
refers to the architecture that includes command, control, and communications. NC2 refers strictly to the nuclear command 
and control. 
16 2016 Nuclear Matters Handbook: Authoritative Guide to American Atomic Weapons, History, Testing, Safety, Security, 
Delivery Systems, Physics and Bomb Designs, Terror Threats, 2017, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB/chapters/chapter_6.htm, 73. 
17 “Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: Update on Air Force Oversight Effort and Selected Acquisition 
Programs” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 15 Aug. 2017. 
18 2016 Nuclear Matters Handbook (2017), 73. 
19 ibid, 73. 
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USSTRATCOM’s Global Operation Center (GOC)20 serves as an additional NC2 fixed-site 
facility. If the two fixed sites were unable to function, there are two airborne, survivable 
alternatives. 
 The Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment System (ITW/AA) are sensors 
that collect information on behalf of NCCS operations. These sensors include radars, 
infrared satellites, fixed and mobile sensors, and processing systems. The ITW/AA provides 
“unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable, and enduring warning information of 
ballistic missile, space, and air attacks on North America.”21 The sensor network not only 
provides continuous surveillance, but also enables correlation and independent verification 
of potential threats. ITW/AA also consists of capabilities to warn the President, Secretary of 
Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the assessment function reports 
whether a threat holds North America or U.S. assets at-risk.22 
 The transport component ensures both data and decisions can move reliably from 
sensors to command centers to delivery platforms. This necessitates robust, reliable, and 
survivable – including during a nuclear environment – communication methods. 
Additionally, NC3 relies on airborne relay and satellites to transmit and receive critical 
information. It also maintains land-based phone lines and undersea cables. If crisis or the 
need arises, NCCS must also be capable of transmitting commands and directives from 
decision-makers to all nuclear-capable platforms.  
 The fourth NC3 component is the nuclear weapon platforms and delivery systems 
capable of kinetic action. Air-launched platforms include heavy bombers23 and dual-
                                                          
20 Located at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. 
21 ibid, 76. 
22 ibid, 73-76. 
23 Heavy bombers include the B-52H and B-2 which would deploy the W80-1 Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and B61-
7/11, B83-1 respectively. ibid, 25. 
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capable24 aircraft. The Minuteman III system is the U.S. ground-launched delivery system 
and the Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines are America’s sea-launched delivery 
systems.  
Each of these platforms are capable of receiving, analyzing, and communicating data 
quickly. Threats to any of these systems – from communication lines to delivery platforms – 
that would reduce the system’s ability to process data and disseminate information could be 
interpreted as a threat to the nuclear stability. The loss of data sources or communication 
channels would impose a limitation on the President’s ability to make an informed decision 
and the system to execute that decision. As such, from the military’s perspective, quickly 
identifying, managing, and holding these threats at-risk is critical. Systems that employ 
machine learning – and eventually true artificial intelligence – can aid in this task and 
contribute generally to NCCS objectives. 
Reduce Errors, Maximize Capabilities, and Minimize Losses 
The uses for ML systems in the NC3 context are vast. To limit the scope of this 
discussion, this paper will make continued use of NCCS objectives as defined in the 2016 
Nuclear Matters Handbook. Using these objectives as a guidon, below are a few identified 
opportunities for ML – and eventually true AI – systems. 
In the short term, one of the more natural uses of a deep learning system is with 
respect to automatic target recognition (ATR) to identify false positive sensor data to 
mitigate the chance of a tech-induced crisis. As previously discussed in the radiology 
example, neural network developments have contributed to great improvements in image 
recognition to reduce false negative diagnoses. Related to ATR, a false negative result 
                                                          
24 Dual-capable aircraft can fulfill conventional or nuclear theatre missions. These platforms include F-15, F-16, some NATO 
aircraft, and the F-35. ibid, 25. 
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translates into an inbound missile that was either undetected, incorrectly classified as 
noise, or marked invalid. A false positive result, on the other hand, would be the 
appearance of an inbound track that did not exist in reality or was incorrectly classified as 
a missile. The objective of this type of learning agent would be to reduce the number of false 
positives – of which there are infamous cases25 – and increase confidence with regards to 
negative outputs. Credibly reducing the false positive tracks will encourage more effective 
interrogation of the tracks that do appear. Anecdotally, when the system continually 
reports false positives the watch standers analyze those tracks less intensely. In turn, this 
increases the likelihood of false negative reporting. ML systems that reduce false positives 
will also likely increase watch stander vigilance, providing a substantive improvement to 
NC3 operations. 
 Computer agents can also be employed to rapidly synthesize intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance data from sensors to deter an attack against the United 
States and its allies. Today mobile launchers are difficult to track and target. Adversarial 
nations see advantages in road or mobile launchers because they can be moved regularly 
and striking them would require multiple missiles.26 America’s deterrent credibility can be 
strengthened by an agent with the ability to synthesize data related to an adversary’s 
mobile launchers – including location and capability – and helps hold them at-risk. The 
threat posed by foreign mobile launchers would be reduced if a system had the ability to 
collate continuously updated sensor data with regards to the disposition of mobile 
launchers.  
                                                          
25  In September 1983, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov chose to reject a “launch” command from a Soviet early warning system 
when it was reported with “high reliability” that an American ICBM was inbound. Matthews, Dylan. “35 Years Ago Today, 
One Man Saved Us from World-Ending Nuclear War.” Vox, Vox, 26 Sept. 2018, www.vox.com/2018/9/26/17905796/nuclear-
war-1983-stanislav-petrov-soviet-union. 




 The security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent could also be aided by a 
force management / decision support system that maximizes second-strike capability. 
Deterrence theory suggests that for a deterrent to be effective, it must credibly dissuade 
adversaries from action through the certainty of retaliation. In this vein, the Nuclear 
Matters Handbook states that a second-strike capability is critical to achieving deterrence 
against an adversary.27 The decision support system could draw from the inventory of 
available sensors to analyze an expansive variable list – including adversary force 
disposition, current U.S. force laydown, nuclear and conventional capabilities of both states, 
damage prediction, etc. – to produce an output that would aid the President and senior 
advisors in decision making. 
It is also important to acknowledge that each of these systems have the potential to 
upset strategic stability and could exacerbate the security dilemma. It would be difficult for 
adversaries to tell the difference between capabilities that are clarifying unknowns versus 
those systems contributing to the capability for preemptive, first-use strike. 
Vulnerabilities, Limitations, and Misuse 
 As described above, ML has vast potential to improve decision-making and minimize 
errors throughout the NC3 architecture. In addition to recognizing these opportunities, 
commanders and mid-grade leadership must also be aware of the technical and 
psychological limitations of adopting ML systems and integrating them into their teams. In 
an earlier discussion, this paper identified that learning systems require effective 
algorithms and training data. The suggestion that these technical inputs must be of a 
certain standard also suggests that these are system vulnerabilities. Additionally, human 
                                                          
27 2016 Nuclear Matters Handbook (2017), 15. 
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users bring their own psychological limitations to the tech-adoption process. As an enabling 
technology and decision-making aid, the ultimate purpose of integrating these systems is to 
assist people. Looking to research in the psychology field, leadership should be aware that 
users are liable to both over rely and underutilize these applications because of human 
biases and heuristics.  
Sources of Error: Data 
Stated generally, learning systems are only as good as the data that trains them. A 
McKinsey Global Institute report describes data as “fuel” and states that “AI28 cannot run 
without a steady diet of data.” Machine learning systems require access to data sets to 
discover patterns, make associations, and develop insights.29 A natural deduction is that 
learning systems are vulnerable to “bad” data. In practice, subversive data can be from 
intentional or unintentional sources.  
During the development of any warfare technology it is reasonable to assume that 
an adversary is going to seek out countertactics or counterstrategy. In the case of data-
trained learning systems, adversaries may look to deploy subversive data techniques. Two 
types of subversive techniques are “data poisoning”30 and “adversarial examples”31. In both 
cases, these tactics target machine learning system’s susceptibility to learn incorrectly or 
misidentify information. A “data poisoning” tactic would “inject false training data with the 
                                                          
28 This quotation uses AI as a generic term. 
29 Barton, Dominic, et al. “Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China.” McKinsey Global Institute, 2018. 
30 Steinhardt, Jacob, et al. “Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks.” 31st Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems, 2017. 




aim of corrupting the learned model.”32 This may be achieved through data security 
breaches or statistical manipulation techniques.33 
“Adversarial examples” seek to fool learning agents. In a relatively mundane 
application, Cornell researchers demonstrated that “state-of-the-art” deep neural network 
image recognition systems could be tricked with “white noise”. In their study, a system that 
was trained to label images was presented a “static” image and the system misidentified it 
as a lion with 99.99% confidence.34 In the NC3 context, this susceptibility to “fooling” – 
sometimes referred to as spoofing – could result in false positive tracks. This could trigger a 
system alert that reports an attack is imminent. In reality it could be the use of an 
adversarial image that is imperceptible to human senses. A false positive track from a ML 
system is particularly concerning because human users may be biased to believe the 
system’s output. This phenomenon is called “automation bias” and will be discussed in a 
future section. From a technical perspective, “there is no known way of fully inoculating 
algorithms against these attacks.”35 Adversaries do not need access to the underlying data 
or algorithm to take advantage of this vulnerability, which makes this data tactic more 
challenging to defend against. Deep learning systems are also susceptible to this 
vulnerability.36 
The threats to data are not just limited to an adversary’s attempts to hack machine 
learning systems. Unintentional data subversions could also be detrimental. This might be 
particularly true when introducing these systems into NC3. Given the lack of real-world 
                                                          
32 Steinhardt (2017). 
33 On a spectrum of complexity, data security breaches would be at the low-end of data poisoning techniques while statistical 
manipulation is still in theory only. Security breaches are discussed in the Steinhardt papers. The statistical manipulation 
techniques are based on conversations the author has had with DoD AI-Consultants. 
34 In another example, an imperceptible change of the image tricked the system to relabel a lion’s image to “library”. Nguyen, 
Anh, et al. “Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images.” Cornell 
University, 2 Apr. 2015. 




scenarios involving nuclear crisis operations, data is extremely limited.37 Therefore, 
learning systems that are employed in the NC3 field will likely be trained utilizing 
wargame data. Wargame data may contain three potential sources of data bias. The first is 
the assumption that players will make the same decisions in real-life as they did in a 
simulation. Although simulations are generally effective at reflecting real-world conditions, 
it may not be possible to truly simulate the moral weight that surrounds deciding to use 
nuclear weapons. 
The second, that strategic decision making in wargames will naturally be based on 
the responses of a “red team” within the game. Can we ever be confident that the “red 
team” is accurately reflecting the most likely strategic decisions of an adversary? To say 
yes, makes two assumptions – that red team participants can accurately reflect adversarial 
strategy and tactics, and that they are allowed to do so. First, it would be presumptuous for 
any “red team” to believe they could effectively deploy their knowledge of Chinese or 
Russian strategic thinking as it relates to nuclear weapons in a wargame. There is minimal 
precedent and understanding to make those assertions. Second, provided new evidence, 
would participants be empowered to challenge the status quo perception of adversary 
decision-making? For example, Millennium Challenge 2002 was a U.S.-led wargame that 
simulated a war in the Middle East. In the games initial trial, Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper had 
decimated the American forces using “unconventional” tactics.38 Lt. Gen. Van Riper was 
chastised for performing irrationally and when the wargame was reset for a second round, 
                                                          
37 I do not believe I am in a position to claim that this data does not exist. There are most likely case studies – from the Cold 
War era – where tactical or strategic nuclear options were discussed. Additionally, the Trump Administration’s Nuclear 
Posture Review stated its intention to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal to include low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. 
Wargames or actual events – data opportunities – likely suggested that there would be benefit to owning these weapons. 




the exercise was “almost entirely scripted to ensure a [US] win.”39 This story helps 
illustrate the difficulties of challenging perceptions of senior officers and officials within the 
military. 
Finally, based on information available, the President has not participated in past 
strategic wargames.40 Instead of his direct participation, someone has simulated the 
President’s decision-making authority. In a recent analysis of Cold War wargames, it was 
found that wargamers used nuclear weapons more frequently in the game than the 
President has done in reality.41 As a result, wargame data may inherently contain an 
“upwardly” biased dataset.42 The biases that may be introduced from wargame data 
suggests that prior to the employment of any learning system trained using data, a 
discussion related to the possible direction of bias and a plan to mitigate these impacts 
should be thoroughly had. 
Sources of Error: Defining and Controlling Learning 
At their core, machine learning algorithms are the development and employment of 
mathematical and statistical models.43 Biases in algorithmic design can stem from 
misarticulated problem framing. “Second-strike capability”, for example, is a vague 
objective. To concretize this aim, the system may be designed to maximize second-strike 
capability vis-à-vis military infrastructure or against population centers. These 
                                                          
39 Borger, Julian. “War Game Was Fixed to Ensure American Victory, Claims General.” The Guardian, 21 Aug. 2002, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/21/usa.julianborger. 
40 Thomas Schelling advised against presidential participation, “…I do not think he should ever be put in the position where 
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counterforce versus countervalue strategies may both achieve the second-strike objective 
but may not meet the intentions of different strategic planners and administrations.  
Additionally, choices made for what data the algorithm should consider during the 
data preparation can also alter the model’s accuracy.44 For example, currently China’s 
People’s Liberation Army Navy is growing their capacity for a more dispersed nuclear 
force.45 If the aforementioned machine learning system to maximize second-strike 
capability were being designed today, should it account for the number of nuclear-ballistic 
missile capable submarines not imaged in-port? If these unlocated submarines do not have 
functional nuclear strike capability the model might upwardly bias its perception of China’s 
threat. On the other hand, if these are not included, but development of this capability 
occurs sooner than our intelligence estimates predict, then the model might be downward 
biased. 
The current state of the technology also results in algorithms learning in unexpected 
or uncontrolled ways. These uncontrolled evolutions occur when “we specify the wrong 
objective function, are not careful about the learning process, or commit other machine 
learning-related implementation.”46 These “unexpected results often result from evolution 
thwarting a researcher’s intentions: by exploiting a bug in the code, by optimizing an 
uninteresting feature, or by failing to answer the intended research question.”47 Control 
issues highlight the parts of “alchemy” that currently characterize ML. That is to say, 
machines are learning, but the developer struggles to explain exactly how an algorithm 
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evolves. Comical examples of this include a Tetris-playing robot that learned to pause the 
game rather than lose.48 Or a robot that learned to walk on its elbows when programmers 
created an environment where all six of its legs were not functional.49 These evolutions 
would be much less welcomed in the nuclear command and control structure, and right now 
developers are not able to track how these evolutions take place. 
Sources of Error: Human Users 
 Researchers from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania have coined 
the term “algorithm aversion”. This refers to people’s reluctance to trust the work of 
machines because they believe humans can perform better. This phenomenon was captured 
by researchers whose studies concluded “seeing algorithms err [made] people less confident 
in them and less likely to choose them over an inferior human forecaster.”50 According to 
the studies’ results, “it seems that the errors that we tolerate in humans become less 
tolerable when machines make them.”51 This trust gap can result in human users being 
unwilling to use a system or to use it for its intended purposes. 
 The opposite of the trust gap is referred to as automation bias. According to Dr. 
Linda Skitka, a psychologist who studies the types of errors people are prone to make in 
automated decision-making environments, automation bias is the “use of automation as a 
heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing.”52 Rather than 
conducting their own investigation of available data, people are over-reliant on the solution 
presented to them by the computer. This bias can result in both errors of commission and 
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omission. Errors of commission are actions that the human actor takes that he or she 
should not, while errors of omission are those that were not taken that should have been. In 
Skitka’s research, it appears that automation bias reinforced the latter of these error types. 
It is likely that this bias may be amplified in crises due to limited time and increased 
stress. To mitigate the impact of this bias, leadership must ensure that personnel are being 
trained to be critical consumers of data. 
 RAND conducted workshops to discuss the potential impact of advanced AI53 on 
nuclear security in mid-2017. The human end-user came up in discussion related to 
whether humans would be comfortable or not allowing a computer to influence decision-
making in a nuclear war scenario. Interestingly, although participants took positions on 
both sides of the debate, it appeared opinions were divided inter-generationally. Namely, 
younger participants felt more comfortable with the idea that AI-systems could influence 
decisions of this magnitude. 
Recommendations to Integrate Machine Learning Systems in NC3 
 As an enabling technology, AI and ML systems are a revolutionary technology that 
will expand the possibilities frontier across the national security spectrum. Specific to the 
nuclear command and control field, it will help collate information and improve the rate of 
false negatives among the other opportunities previously discussed. All of these 
potentialities require that, despite limitations, strategic command leadership must adopt 
this technology. This adoption must be done carefully. If improperly applied, there is the 
risk that an entire generation of leaders will be reluctant to use the technology, fulfilling 
the algorithmic aversion bias. In an effort to bring these systems online in a productive 
                                                          




manner, I offer three recommendations: One, bridge the civilian-military divide between 
Silicon Valley and the Pentagon through a military ambassadorial team stationed in Silicon 
Valley. Two, procure ML systems through an agile system procurement method. And three, 
ensure that the teams developing and utilizing these systems are diverse. 
Build Civ-Mil Cooperation with Military Liaisons 
 One of the first challenges that will have to be overcome in order to procure ML 
agents for military use is to get over some of the reluctance that the most capable 
developers have demonstrated recently.54 This rift has been attributed to moral objections 
from technologists and workers in the valley.55 Others have argued that the divide is more 
practical and is driven by fiscal responsibility at a start-up.56 Unlike other military 
technologies – such as missile development – large defense contractors do not have the 
expertise to develop systems at a level than can compete in the current global race.57 This 
expertise and experience with ML – and eventually true AI systems –exists outside the 
traditional military-industrial complex. Thus, in an effort to build systems that are not 
burdened by some of the aforementioned limitations, it will be required for the two parties 
to talk to each other. 
 Past initiatives by the Pentagon to leverage the idea generation occurring in the 
start-up tech world include In-Q-Tel and Defense Innovation Unit. IQT is a not-for-profit 
strategic investor that funds startups who are creating innovative technologies for use in 
the national security space. DIU is a government entity that contracts with technology 
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companies to solve defense issues. Both of these entities positively contribute to innovation 
and procuring national security needs, but frankly, their scale is too small, and they do not 
address the interpersonal challenges between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley. 
One means of closing this interpersonal gap would be through a military liaison unit 
posted in Silicon Valley. This recommendation is inspired by Denmark’s Tech Ambassador 
who maintains a physical presence there. Out of recognition of “the key role that technology 
and digitalisation plays and will increasingly play in the future for individuals and societies 
alike,” the Tech Ambassador contributes to a “stronger multi-stakeholder discussion on how 
we want these new technologies to shape our societies in the future.”58 Similarly, the 
military liaison unit would facilitate stakeholder discussions over key national security 
issues. This unit should be led by a 3-star General or Admiral reporting to CYBERCOM 
and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. After 
establishing the channel for communication between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley, the 
next step is to define how cooperation between the two parties should be conducted. 
System Procurement Utilizing an Agile Process 
 In general, the two most fundamental forms of software development are traditional 
and agile approach. Traditional project management – also referred to as the waterfall 
approach – is a linear-phased development approach. According to the Project Management 
Institute, the waterfall methodology is characterized by a detailed, long-term project plan 
with a single timeline and a product that is delivered at the end of that timeline. The 
project management structure is more rigid than the agile method, and changes to the 
                                                          




deliverables are costly.59 On the other hand, agile projects are based on shorter timelines 
and multiple delivery dates. Although the product timeline is less definitive and delivered 
at functional stages, changes to the product are frequent and expected.60 Additionally, the 
end-user is involved throughout the agile process, helping guide each iteration, while the 
traditional method only involves the end-user at the beginning and end of the project. 
 The agile method is driven by twelve principles.61 Of note, the agile process 
“welcome[s] changing requirements, even late in development. Agile processes harness 
change for the customer's competitive advantage.”62 This methodology encourages – and 
necessitates – stakeholder involvement and transparency. It also has shorter product 
delivery timelines, accommodates needs that are in flux, and focuses on the user. 
 For a ML end-product to be delivered on behalf of NC3 operations, the 
implementation needs to be seamless. Because of the potential for biases – from data and 
algorithms – it will be important for end-users, rather than developers, to stress test and 
run scenarios using the equipment to identify where these systems may go awry. 
Additionally, strategic developments and capacity – although not constantly changing – 
occur frequently enough that iterative products might require tweaks to underlying 
algorithms. For these reasons, an agile development process has greater potential to 
mitigate the potential vulnerabilities that have been explored in this paper. 
Personnel Diversity 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that despite all of the advances in 
technology, fundamentally, human actions and decisions are behind building and using the 
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machine learning systems that will be deployed in an NC3 capacity. Because the human 
element is still so fundamental, it is critical to bring in diverse worldviews to develop these 
technologies. Silicon valley – and the technology sector more broadly – is infamously 
plagued by a lack of diversity.63 In warfare and the national security space, America’s 
willingness to take advantage of diversity has made the nation more secure.64 As the 
United States continues to recognize and lean forward into developing AI for the NC3 
architecture, it is essential that it pushes tech to diversify in an effort to solve the complex 
challenges it will face in development. 
It is important for personnel diversity to exist at all levels as machine learning 
systems are attempted to be brought online. From technical developers to command center 
watch standers to on-the-ground responders who will use and be impacted by the new 
applications, broad cognitive perspectives and backgrounds are essential. It is commonly 
understood that diversity encourages greater cooperation and better problem-solving ability 
in teams. This is likely even more important when developing emerging technology for 
crisis management purposes. First, in conjunction with a previous recommendation, the 
agile process requires close interaction between developers and end-users, necessitating 
cooperation. Second, mitigating the challenges of algorithmic bias will require multiple 
perspectives and intuitions about how to solve problems. Finally, because humans will be 
employing this technology, their individual psychology will impact how they rely and use 
the outputs provided. If all individuals approach the problem in a similar manner, the 
individual cognitive biases will be compounded. Given how a focus on ensuring diversity 
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could reduce data, algorithmic, and cognitive biases, it appears to be a critical factor in 
developing the most capable systems. 
Conclusion 
Given the current state of AI and ML technology, it is important to remember that 
instruments of war are inherently built by and deployed on behalf of people. This suggests 
that a learning system’s inherent capabilities are robust but limited, employment may be 
well-intended but misinformed, and its impact may be tactically efficient but strategically 
destabilizing. As these technologies are adopted and integrated into the NC3 architecture, 
leadership must strike a balance between employing the technology without overreliance 
and maintaining tempered faith in its potential. 
An outstanding item that requires additional research is the impact of introducing 
this technology to nuclear stability. Based on its current formulation, this nuclear balance 
can be potentially threatened or improved. Threats to this stability may result from a new 
imposition on the security dilemma. The development of machine learning technology has 
vastly improved machine vision and signal processing, which has improved the quality of 
percepts and programmatic fusion within the computer agent.65 This technology may enable 
autonomous underwater vehicles that may eventually be capable – or give the perception of 
capability – of identifying and holding at risk another nation’s “survivable forces”, 
threatening their second strike capability and increasing the possibility that one might 
threaten a first strike. To mitigate this risk, it may be in U.S. interests to declare a “no 
first-use” policy. 
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Optimistically, there is the potential for these systems to reduce tension and bring 
greater assurance to strategic stability. A 2018 RAND “Security 2040” report suggests three 
primary ways that this could occur. One, AI and ML systems, after a period of introduction 
where their reliability increases and limitations become better understood, would have 
capabilities that are less fallible and error-prone than human alternatives. Two, “launch 
under attack” postures may be reduced because AI and ML systems would contribute to 
higher-reliability early warning systems, intelligence gathering, and analysis resulting in 
greater first-strike stability. Finally, “radical transparency” among nuclear states regarding 
advanced learning systems limit the space for miscalculation. In order to achieve any of 
these optimistic outcomes, diplomatic negotiations and compromises will be required.  
Whereas this paper aimed to highlight and make recommendations related to the 
current state of machine learning technology, much greater research is required to 
highlight the potential limitations of future AI-driven systems. The algorithm “control 
issue” seems of particular importance as new leaps and capabilities are developed within 
this space. Before advances in AI research allow these systems to transition from decision 
support aids to onboard expert systems, researchers must be able to explain algorithmic 
evolution. The vulnerability to “adversarial images” is also open-ended question. From the 
machine-user perspective, bridging the trust gap described by algorithmic aversion will be 
important to ensure that systems are being properly employed.  
As technical advancements are made and state modernize their nuclear capability, it 
is inevitable that systems replicating human intelligence – ranging from automated to 
autonomous to artificial intelligence systems – will be employed in nuclear command and 
control. The overall objective of integrating an enabling technology like machine learning 
into the nuclear command and control sphere should be to help decision-makers have ample 
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time and information to make decisions of such complexity and consequence. As such, 
despite the rise of various emerging technologies, human beings continue to be the forces 
behind war. The limitations that humans have may be mitigated, but not eliminated, 
through the use of technology. If the prospect of nuclear war is on the horizon, this is not a 
responsibility to be delegated to a computer agent. These must remain human decisions 
where values, morality, and the character of a nation should carry more influence than an 
algorithm.  
